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Consider the following dilemma. The former head of a Chinese prison is
visiting the United States for his daughter's wedding. A number of former
prisoners whom he personally tortured' before their release and subsequent
emigration to the United States would like to file a civil suit against him under
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 2 and the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA)3 in an effort to obtain monetary compensation. Meanwhile, the Justice
Department is compiling evidence that might allow an indictment under the
new U.S. anti-torture criminal law4 within a few months of his visit. The
President, however, is trying to conclude a major treaty negotiation with China
and fears the political repercussions of either suit, especially the criminal one.
Should either action go forward?
This example illustrates the potential complexities arising from Congress's
beginning to accept national criminal jurisdiction over severe human fights
violations. In 1994, the United States changed its criminal code to provide that
any U.S. national or person physically located within the United States could
be held criminally liable for torture he or she commits anywhere against
anyone.5 This statutory change, part of the U.S. ratification of the Convention
1. The practice of torture in Chinese prisons is widespread See ANINETY Irr'L, CHINA. No ONE Is
SAFE 63-84 (1996).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
3. Id.
4. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340 (West. Supp. 1997).
5. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1994 and 1995. Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 506
(a), 108 Stat. 382, 463-64 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340 (\Vest Supp 1997)) Behavior is
considered torture only if it is commiued in an official capacity or under the color of state law. See § 2340
("'ITorture' means an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically intended to
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffenng incidental to lawful
sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control ).
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Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman and Degrading Treatment,6
represents a watershed in the evolution of U.S. human rights protection. Not
only can torturers face civil liability for their abuses under the ATCA and the
TVPA, but they also can be jailed for up to twenty years or even receive life
imprisonment or the death penalty if their behavior resulted in death.7
This statute thus expanded U.S. reliance upon universal jurisdiction.
International law recognizes five grounds upon which states can base their
jurisdiction: Territorial jurisdiction stems from wrongs occurring within a
nation's territory; nationality jurisdiction is based on an offender's being a
national of the state taking jurisdiction; passive personality jurisdiction occurs
when a victim is a national of the state; protective jurisdiction is based on the
acts impinging upon important state interests or national security; and universal
jurisdiction stems from the notion that some international prohibitions are so
important that a violation of them by anyone, anywhere, warrants any nation's
taking jurisdiction! This universality principle is the jurisdictional base for
nations to prosecute human rights offenders; their violations are such egregious
wrongs that their behavior is of every nation's concern.
Although the U.S. criminal law regarding torture represents an important
new vehicle for bringing human rights offenders to justice, it is a natural
evolution of the existing international and domestic criminal law. Unlike the
early human rights conventions, more recent treaties contain specific provisions
requiring prosecution or extradition of offenders within their borders,9 Both
international treaty and customary law recognize many human rights norms as
conferring universal jurisdiction. Likewise, U.S. statutes increasingly have
provided for national criminal jurisdiction in areas connected to human rights,
such as terrorism and hostage taking.'0 In addition to the traditional territorial
base, judicial decisions have recognized nationality, universality, and passive
personality jurisdictional bases in a criminal context. The courts also have
given great leeway in cases involving forcible abduction of defendants in other
countries and have denied many constitutional protections to alien
6. G.A. Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1984/72, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984),
revised by 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter Torture Convention]. The Torture Convention entered into
force for the United States on November 20, 1994. See 2 GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN
FORCE 700 (Igor I. Kauass ed., 1996 ed.).
7. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2340(a).
8. For an analysis of these five jurisdictional bases, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 300-05 (4th ed. 1990); Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1048-86 (3d ed. 1993); and Ved P. Nanda, International Human Rights and International
Criminal Law and Procedure: Judicial Remedies in United States Courts for Breaches of Internationally
Protected Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A GUIDE TO U.S. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
483, 490-93 (Ved P. Nanda & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW]. Kenneth Randall provides an extensive discussion of universal jurisdiction. See Kenneth C. Randall,
Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785 (1988).
9. For a discussion of this evolution, see infra Section I.A.
10. For a discussion of the existing U.S. statutory regime, see infra Section I.B.
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defendants." Together, these developments indicate a growing U.S.
assertiveness and recognition of its international obligations in the criminal
jurisdictional sphere.
Not surprisingly, these changes have had their critics. Scholarly literature
in particular has questioned the judicial acceptance of forcible abduction and
denial of rights to defendants abroad.'2 Many scholars have discussed how
far national criminal jurisdiction should reach, with particular exploration of
nationality, passive personality, and universal jurisdiction.'3 Despite all of this
commentary, no systematic analysis of national criminal jurisdiction over
human rights violators has occurred
This Note aims to fill that gap by tracing the development of national
criminal jurisdiction in international human rights law and its manifestation in
U.S. law. It advocates an expanded statutory regime and a systematic approach
to prosecution. After considering some of the potential pitfalls of broader
criminal jurisdiction over international human rights violations, it recommends
statutory and litigative approaches to address them. Part I describes the
evolution of international human rights law toward the recognition of national
criminal jurisdiction and the United States's implementation of such
jurisdiction. Part II analyzes policy reasons for expanding national criminal
jurisdiction: the need to enforce universal norms, the limitations of
international mechanisms, and the incompleteness of national civil jurisdiction.
Part III considers some problems that might result from broader jurisdiction,
such as sovereignty and legitimacy concerns, undermining of civil redress
mechanisms, ambiguities of scope, and difficulties of accessing prosecution.
Part IV suggests statutory criminalization of clearly established international
human rights violations and discretionary use of criminal litigation based on
a comparative forum conveniens analysis. International criminal jurisdiction,
the Note concludes, provides an important mechanism of justice beyond that
provided by civil law but should be expanded carefully.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER INTERNATIONAL WRONGS
From the early recognition of pirates as enemies of mankind whom any
nation had jurisdiction to prosecute, international law has evolved to contain
explicit treaty provisions requiring national criminal jurisdiction for particular
human rights violations. These provisions represent a shift from post-World
War II international criminal law, which provided for much more limited
national jurisdiction or no explicit discussion of such jurisdiction. U.S. law
I1. See infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 65.
13. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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gradually has followed this evolution, with the criminalization of torture
representing an important expansion. To explore the international basis for U.S.
criminal jurisdiction over human rights offenders, this part reviews the growth
of national jurisdiction through human rights treaties and custom and discusses
the U.S. implementation of these norms in the criminal context.
A. Evolution of International Law
The use of universal jurisdiction in a national criminal context has
expanded greatly in the latter half of this century. Traditionally, international
law has recognized five bases for national jurisdiction: territoriality, nationality,
passive personality, protectiveness, and universality. 4 Until the middle of the
twentieth century, however, domestic exercise of criminal jurisdiction was
based almost exclusively on territorial grounds. Both public and private
international law indicated that criminal law should apply primarily to crimes
occurring within a nation's territory. 5 Piracy served as an important
exception to this rule and thus as the progenitor of some of the later
jurisdictional expansions.16
Even before the growth of human rights law following World War II,
international criminal law and universal jurisdiction existed in the form of
piracy prohibitions. Pirates were considered "hostis humanis generis,"'1
7
enemies of mankind, and any nation could take jurisdiction over them. This
approach toward piracy, however, did not stem from the expansive views of
national criminal jurisdiction embodied in modem treaties. Instead, the peculiar
character of piracy probably accounted for its internationalization as a crime;
pirates committed offenses on the high seas, which were not within the
jurisdiction of any country.'
The conception that some acts occurring within national borders are so
unacceptable that they violate international law came with the end of World
War II. Through the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 9 and the
14. See supra text accompanying note 8.
15. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1, 8-9 (1992).
16. See BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 238-49 (describing the expansion ofjurisdictional rules governing
pursuit and capture of pirates to cover submarine warfare, blockades, and actions necessary to maintain
order on the high seas).
17. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980); see also BROWNLIS, supra note 8, at 238-
39.
18. Although pirates entered national territory by boarding a flag ship, this "territory" could then be
moved throughout the high seas. If the nation owning the ship were the only one that could assume
jurisdiction, pirates could easily escape capture and prosecution by boarding ships far from their home ports
and keeping them beyond the reach of the home navies. National criminal jurisdiction over all pirates
allowed nations to cooperate in fighting this common scourge. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at
238-39 (discussing the international regime for maintaining order on the high seas).
19. Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 561-63
(discussing the Charter's war crimes provisions).
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (also
known as the Genocide Convention),20  the international community
established crimes against peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity,2' and
genocide2 2 as international crimes.
This recognition, however, did not include particularly expansive notions
of national jurisdiction over these crimes. The Charter for the International
Military Tribunal did not mention national jurisdiction at all, and the Genocide
Convention specified two possible places for a trial: the country in which the
abuses occurred or an international tribunal.23 In accord with this limited
national jurisdiction, the world community held trials at international tribunals
established in Nuremberg and Tokyo.24 While numerous national prosecutions
of German and Japanese war criminals occurred, they did not rest on these
international conventions' granting universal jurisdiction.Y For example,
20. Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Conventionl.
21. Crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity were recognized in the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, supra note 19, 59 StaL at 1547. 82 U.N.T.S. at 288 The Charter's
article 6(a) defines crimes against peace as "planning. preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Id. Article 6(b) defines war
crimes as "violations of the laws or customs of war," id., and then details the exact violations included, see
id. Crimes against humanity are defined in article 6(c) as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or dunng the war or perscutions
on political, racial or religious grounds ..... Id.
22. See Genocide Convention, supra note 20, at 280. The Convention defines genocide as acts
"committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as
such," including killing, causing mental or physical harm, Durposely inflicting unacceptable living
conditions on a group, birth prevention, and forcibly transferring children to another group Id It punishes
"genocide," "conspiracy to commit genocide," "direct and public incitement to commit genocide." "attempt
to commit genocide," and "complicity in genocide." Id.
23. See Genocide Convention, supra note 20, at 280-82.
24. Many of the issues that arose during the Nuremberg and Tokyo tnals-sovereignty, chains of
accountability, lack of international structures, psychological pain, appropriate prosecution of massive
human rights violations-are unfortunately still salient today. Numerous scholars have extensively grappled
with the meaning of these trials in international law. For an excellent discussion of international law
concerns arising from the Tokyo trials. see Knut Ipsen, A Review of [te Mare Legal Aspects of rise Toki'o
Trial and Their Influence on the Development of International Law. in THE TOKYO WAR CRLtEs TRIAL
AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOsIUM 37 (C. Hoyasa ct al. eds.. 1986). The recent 50th anniversary of
Nuremberg served as an important reflective point for evaluating the international community's progress
on these issues. See, e.g., Graham T. Blewiu, Ad Hoc Tribunals Half a Century After Nuremberg. 149 MIL
L. REv. 101 (1995) (discussing the importance of building on the Nuremberg legacy, analyzing the ad hoc
tribunals as important steps, and arguing for an international criminal court); Judgments on Nuremberg: The
Past Half Century and Beyond-A Panel Discussion of Nuremberg Prosecutors. 16 B C THIRD WORLD
LJ. 193 (1996) (describing personal experiences and reflections on Nuremberg by six of the prosecutors
at the trials); Henry T. King, Nuremberg and Sovereignty, 28 C~.sE W. RES. J. IN "r' L. 135 (1996)
(analyzing Nuremberg's piercing of sovereignty and its subsequent impact on individuals, state sovereignty.
and regional human rights law); Fred L. Morrison, The Significance of Nureinbergfor Modern Internanonal
Law, 149 MIL. L. REV. 207 (1995) (analyzing Nuremberg as symbolizing the transition from the
Westphalian model of state sovereignty to the modem one); Michael P Scharf, Have We Really Learned
the Lessons of Nuremberg?, 149 MIL. L. REv. 65 (1995) (analyzing the extent to which the Yugoslav
tribunal has avoided the four main criticisms of Nuremberg: being a victor's tribunal, cx post facto
prosecution, lack of due process, and the absence of appeals).
25. In addition to the international tribunals, the victors held trials either in their occupation zones or
under international auspices and directly before their national tribunals Often, the war criminals had injured
nationals of the prosecuting state, creating passive personality jurisdiction See JORDAN J PAUST hT AL.
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although Israel was able to try Adolph Eichmann for genocide on universal
jurisdiction grounds,26 the initial human rights conventions did not provide
explicitly for national jurisdiction over international crimes.
An important step toward an increased national role in policing human
rights abuses came in 1956 with the Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar
to Slavery.27 This Convention criminalized the "act of conveying or
attempting to convey slaves from one country to another by whatever means
of transport, or of being accessory thereto . *."..28 Article 3 of this
Convention required the national criminalization of the slave trade, "effective
measures" to prevent mechanisms of trade within the territory of signatories,
and international cooperation regarding the commission and prosecution of the
slave trade.29 While this Convention does not indicate that trade occurring
within other countries can be punished in a third nation, its provisions suggest
that national courts are an appropriate forum for this international crime.
With the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid in 1973,30 the potential role of national courts in
prosecuting international crimes expanded once again. The Convention
criminalizes apartheid, defining it as certain "inhuman acts committed for the
purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of
persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing
them."'3' Articles IV and V of the Convention mandate judicial, legislative,
and administrative measures against people committing apartheid in a state
regardless of residence or nationality and indicate that any state party with
personal jurisdiction can try any person charged.32 This approach represents
a shift toward the international recognition of national criminal universal
jurisdiction. Although the Convention does not explicitly mention universal
jurisdiction as its basis, this is the only one of the five bases for jurisdiction
that would apply to apartheid not specifically tied to the prosecuting nation.33
The international community's attempt to deal with international terrorism
in its various forms during the 1970s provided another extension of these
modern conceptions of national criminal jurisdiction. 34 Article 4 of the 1970
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 719-21 (1996).
26. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 1083-86.
27. Sept. 4, 1956, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
28. Id., 266 U.N.T.S. at 42.
29. Id. This Article does not specifically indicate the provision's jurisdictional base.
30. Adopted Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244.
31. Id. art. I, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 245. Article II more specifically describes both legislative measures
and violations of living conditions, life, and liberty that contravene the Convention. See id.
32. See id., 1015 U.N.T.S. at 246.
33. The provision granting national jurisdiction does not discuss links of territory, the nationality of
victim or offender, or national security concerns. Given the human rights context, universal jurisdiction,
the only base remaining, seems to be the assumed ground for jurisdiction.
34. See generally B.J. George, Jr., Federal Anti-Terrorist Legislation, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 8, at 15.
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Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, for example,
indicates that aircraft hijackers are subject to extradition or prosecution by the
state whose aircraft was hijacked or in whose territory they landed or were
present and that no "criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national
law" is excluded. Article 5 of the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation has an identical
provision. 3 Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages 37 goes further, mandating jurisdiction if the offense
occurs in the territory of the state (territoriality), if the offender is a national
(nationality) or stateless resident, if the act was cormmitted to compel the state
(passive personality), if the victim is a national of the state when deemed
appropriate (protectiveness), or if the offender is present in the territory and
not being extradited (universality). 3' This movement toward more expansive
extraterritorial provisions over the course of the 1970s reflects the trend in the
international community to allow national criminal jurisdiction on a growing
number of grounds.
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment,39 which came into force in 1987, is the most
expansive treaty explication of national criminal jurisdiction over human rights
offenders. Article 5 mandates jurisdiction when offenses occur within the
territory (territoriality), are committed by a national (nationality), are against
a national, as deemed appropriate by the prosecuting state (protectiveness), or
are committed by an offender located within the state's territory if extradition
does not occur (universality).' It further permits any criminal jurisdiction
allowed by internal law." These broad jurisdictional requirements solidify the
proposition that international law demands expansive national jurisdiction in
the case of torture.
35. Opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, 10 L.L.M. 133. 134 The Convention defines a hijacker as
someone who "unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation. seitzes. or
exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act." or *'an accomplice" of such person
Id. art. 1, 10 I.L.M. at 133. While the convention does not explicitly discuss bases of jurisdiction.
territoriality applies if a hijacking occurs in a state's aircraft or upon landing in a particular state See id
art. 4, 10 I.L.M. at 134. The sufficiency of the presence of the offender with no other ties. however.
suggests a recognition of universal jurisdiction.
36. Opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 1151, 1154 The Convention includes in Its
definition of sabotage a variety of types of violence against aircraft, navigation factlies and people See
id. art. 1, 10 I.L.M. at 1152.
37. Adopted Dec. 12, 1979, G.A. Res. 341146, U.N. GAOR. 34th Sess. Supp No 99. U N Doc
A134/819, 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979) (hereinafter Hostage Taking Conventioni The Convention describes an
offender as "[alny person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill or to injure or to continue to detain
another person ... in order to compel a third party ... to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the hostage." Id. art I. 18 1 L N1 at 1457 The various (orms used
to establish jurisdiction indicate that any of the five bases would be appropriate
38. See id. art. 5, 18 I.L.M. at 1458.
39. Torture Convention, supra note 6.
40. See id. art. 5, 23 I.L.M. at 1028.
41. See id.
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In addition to these conventions' codification of national criminal
jurisdiction, customary international law now recognizes universal jurisdiction
over a broader range of abuses. The primary difficulty in determining the
appropriateness of expanding jurisdiction based on customary international law
is that it is much more ambiguous than treaty law. Traditionally, customary
norms have been defined as the general and consistent practices of nations that
they themselves view as legally binding.42 A mixture of sources is used to
determine what falls into this category, including international conventions and
other international documents, state behavior, and the work of scholars and
jurists."3 As this Note indicates in its recommendations," clear international
consensus of universal jurisdiction exists only with regard to a few norms,
most of which are also established through treaties.
B. Limited U.S. Implementation of International Criminal Jurisdiction
U.S. incorporation of this expanded national criminal jurisdiction over
severe human rights violations occurring abroad is in its nascent stages. The
three branches of the U.S. government together implement its treaty and
customary law obligations. When the Senate ratifies treaties and creates
implementing statutes, clear legal obligations exist for interpretation by the
courts. Because the United States has ratified and executed few human rights
treaties, however, most of its recognition of these rights has come through
judicial acknowledgment of customary law in civil litigation under the
ATCA.4s In the implementation of human rights obligations, the primary basis
for criminal jurisdiction (when no territoriality or nationality links exist or are
legally required) is universal jurisdiction. Basic human rights serve as
foundational norms of the international community that transcend national
borders. Because these obligations are universal, any state can prosecute their
violation.
Although extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction has emerged in a commercial
42. See BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 4-11. For scholarly discussions of sources analysis in a human
rights context, see John S. Gibson, International Human Rights Law: Progression of Sources, Agencies,
and Law, 14 SUFFOLK TRNSNAT'L L. REv. 41 (1990); and Jordan J. Paust, The Complex Nature, Sources
and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147 (1995/1996). See also Har
M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights Under the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims
of Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 1997) (manuscript at
15-19, on file with the Yale Law Journal) (discussing the difficulties of determining customary international
law).
43. See BROWNL E, supra note 8, at 5; see also Osofsky, supra note 42 (manuscript at 15-19).
44. See infra Part IV.
45. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994); see Karen E. Holt, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala After Ten Years: Major
Breakthrough or Legal Oddity?, 20 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 543 (1990); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling
the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Hwnan Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20
YALE J. INT'L L. 65 (1995); Jeffrey Rabkin, Note, Universal Justice: The Role of Federal Courts in
International Civil Litigation, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 2120 (1995).
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context over the course of the twentieth century,' the statutory basis in a
human rights context is a product of the last three decades.47 These statutes
criminalizing terrorism and torture remain largely untested in U.S. courts, with
only a few cases addressing the extraterritorial reach of antiterrorism criminal
legislation. This section explores the current state of the law providing for
criminal jurisdiction over human rights, both through explicit statutory
protection and through nonstatutory judicial recognition.
1. Statutory Implementation
Despite its only recent prominence, Congress's criminal codification of
universal jurisdiction began almost 200 years ago. In 1819, Congress
criminalized piracy, defined it according to the law of nations, made it
punishable by death, and applied the law to anyone found in or brought to the
United States.4 The basis for this law flowed directly from Article I of the
Constitution.49 It was upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Smith.50
After this early beginning, the year 1974 marked the first time that the
U.S. Congress explicitly codified universal jurisdiction in a criminal context
related to modem human rights. The Antihijacking Act,5 ' passed to
implement U.S. obligations under the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 52 allowed prosecution of offenders in U.S.
custody regardless of where the act occurred or of the nationality of the people
involved.53 By allowing such a jurisdictional approach, Congress for the first
time moved well beyond the strict territoriality of criminal law in a context
related to human rights.
46. See Born, supra note 15, at 8-9 (discussing primarily temtorial approach to junsdiction until mid-
20th century).
47. Telephone Interview with Steven Weglian, Trial Auomey. Terrorism and Violent Crimes Section.
Criminal Div., Department of Justice (Aug. 25, 1997) (describing the development of extrataetonal
jurisdiction with regard to terrorism beginning in the 1970s).
48. See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 154 n.a (1820). The Court quoted from the
Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 76, § 5, which stated
[tihat if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy.
as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders shall afterwards be brought
into, or found in, the United States, every such offender or offenders shall, upon conviction
thereof, before the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District into which he or they may
be brought, or in which he or they shall be found, be punished with death.
Id.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power . Itlo define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations ")
50. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163 (1820).
51. Antihijacking Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, 88 Stat. 409 (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
52. Opened for signature Dec. 16. 1970, 10 I.L.M. 133, 134.
53. See Antihijacking Act of 1974 § 103, 88 Stat. at 410-1I; see also Terry Richard Kane. Prosecuting
International Terrorists in United States Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALE J IN"r'L
L. 294 (1987).
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In 1984, statutory recognition of universal jurisdiction with regard to
international terrorism was expanded further. The Hostage Taking Act,54 the
passage of which implemented U.S. obligations under the International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,5 5 provided that even if the
hostage taking occurs outside of the United States, U.S. courts still have
criminal jurisdiction if the offender or victim is a U.S. national (nationality and
passive personality jurisdiction), "the offender is found in the United States"
(universal jurisdiction), or the offender seeks to compel the U.S. government
to act or to abstain from acting as a release condition (protective principle
jurisdiction).5 6 The fact that mere presence in the United States is sufficient
grounds for invoking jurisdiction suggests U.S. incorporation of universal
jurisdiction; the Act specifically allows for prosecution even if no territoriality
or nationality ties exist beyond the present location of the offender.
Beyond these statutes implementing international conventions, other U.S.
antiterrorism laws have provided for jurisdiction over acts occurring outside
of the United States. For example, in 1986, Congress passed a statute
providing criminal liability for homicide and serious bodily injury of U.S.
nationals abroad.57 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 criminalized conduct outside of the United States that created harm or
risk of harm to people and property in the United States. 5 It also expanded
provisions regarding maritime jurisdiction 9 and domestic conspiracies to
harm people and property abroad,6" increased penalties including those with
regard to explosives,6' and clarified aircraft piracy jurisdiction.62
Little case law interprets the international reach of these statutes; in United
States v. Yunis,63 the D.C. Circuit, however, reinforced the idea that the
jurisdictional base of these antiterrorism statutes is divorced from territoriality.
In this case, the nationality of two unharmed passengers was the only tie to a
U.S. forum, and the court ruled that these Acts provided jurisdiction over the
defendant even though he was forcibly brought to U.S. territory." People
who have not chosen to enter U.S. territory voluntarily still can be viewed as
54. Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking (Hostage Taking Act),
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2186 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
55. Hostage Taking Convention, supra note 37.
56. See Hostage Taking Act § 1203, 98 Stat. at 2186 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
57. See Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 1202(a), 100 Stat. 896, 896-97 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2332
(1994)).
58. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 702(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1291 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332b
(West Supp. 1997)).
59. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1363 (West Supp. 1997).
60. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 956 (West Supp. 1997).
61. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 114, 755, 756, 878(a), 1113, 2332, 844, 842(h), 3295 (West Supp. 1997).
62. See 49 U.S.C.A. 46502(b) (West Supp. 1997).
63. 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
64. See id. at 1090-93.
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present for jurisdictional purposes, the court held.65 Other cases have explored
the meaning of "found in the U.S." and followed the Yunis decision.'
Although forcible abduction is a problematic mechanism for exercising
jurisdiction, these cases indicate U.S. recognition of jurisdiction beyond
traditional territorial grounds. Additional opinions have mentioned the growth
of universal jurisdiction67 and the broad geographic reach intended by the
Antihijacking Act.6
In November 1994, the U.S. Congress moved beyond terrorism to one of
the most traditionally repudiated human rights violations: torture. As discussed
above,6 9 Congress implemented its obligations under the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment by
passing a statute that, much like the Hostage Taking Act, provided for
jurisdiction based on the nationality of the offender or that person's presence
in the forum. Although the statute has not been judicially tested, its explicit
jurisdictional grant makes a broad judicial interpretation probable.
2. Nonstatutory Implications
Since the Supreme Court struck down prosecution based on common law
crimes in the 1812 decision United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,70 no court
has convicted a defendant of a crime not enumerated in a statute.7 Some of
65. See id. Ironically, the United States, in protecting people's rights against terrorism. has not applied
many of the Bill of Rights provisions extraterritorially. See id. at 1092-93 This pracuce has been criticized
as a problematic precedent in international relations. See. e g.. Mason H. Drake. Note. United States v
Yunis: Thle D.C. Circuits Dubious Approval of U.S. Long.Arn Jurzadiction over Extraterritonal Cnmes,
87 Nw. U. L. REV. 697 (1993). The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has held that forcible abduction is an
acceptable mechanism of obtaining jurisdicuon, even when an extradition treaty exists See United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669-70 (1992). Not surprisingly, this decision has received much
criticism as violative of international law and other nauons' sovereignty. See Manuel R. Angulo & James
D. Reardon, Jr., The Apparent Political and Administratve Expediency Exception Establuhed by the
Supreme Court in United States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machan to the Rule of Law as Reflected by
Recognized Principles of International Law, 16 B.C. INT'L & CoMP L. RE v 245. 257-74 (1993). Jonathan
A. Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Macham. 45 STAN L REv 939. 939-
46 (1993); Alfred Paul LeBlanc, Jr., Note, United States v. Alvarez-Macham and the Status of International
Law in American Courts, 53 LA. L. REV. 1411. 1413-16 (1993).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673. 680-81 (S.D.N.Y 1996). United States v
Rezaq, 908 F. Supp. 6, 7-8 (D.D.C. 1995).
67. See Yousef 927 F. Supp. at 681.
68. See United States v. Busic, 592 F.2d 13, 20 (2d Cir 1978)
69. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
70. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). As the Court wrote:
The legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it.
and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of
their institution .... [B]ut all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common law cases we are of
the opinion is not within their implied powers.
Id. at 34.
71. In two cases decided shortly after Hudson & Goodwin, the Supreme Court acknowledged it as
good law. See United States v. Ortega, 24 U.S. (II Wheat) 467. 475 (1826); United States v Coolidge. 14
U.S. (1 Wheat) 415, 415-17 (1816). For scholarly discussion of the implications of Hudson & Goodwin.
see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights a a Constitution, 100 YALE L. 1131. 1194 n 283 (1991); and
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the most deeply imbedded principles of American criminal law undergird this
codification requirement. First, as mentioned twice in the Constitution72 and
in numerous Supreme Court judgments, 73  ex post facto punishment is
forbidden; this prohibition ensures that individuals have fair and reliable
warning of when the United States can punish their behavior.74 Second, the
rule of lenity, which first appeared in sixteenth-century English courts, requires
that ambiguity in penal statutes be strictly constructed; this rule similarly aims
to ensure fair warning.75 Third, the principle of legality, derived from
Enlightenment thinking, posits that only the legislative branch undergirded by
popular sovereignty can criminalize behavior.76 According to this principle,
judge-created crime violates the separation of powers by usurping the
legislature's power to make laws as the representative of the people's will.77
Given these strong bases for requiring statutory criminalization, it thus seems
highly unlikely that the United States would prosecute human rights violators
simply on the basis of a treaty or customary international law.
78
Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian
Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 YALE L.J. 919 (1992). The statutory
basis of criminal law distinguishes it from civil law, which may proceed based on common law alone. In
fact, the ATCA jurisprudence discussed in greater detail later, see infra Section II.C, rests on a statute
allowing suits based on torts in violations of a treaty or the law of nations. Not only are the definitions of
torts themselves based on the common law, but the law of nations, as discussed earlier, see supra text
accompanying notes 42-43, does not rely on explicit codification.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
73. See, e.g., Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-31 (1981); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 227
(1883); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 386-95 (1798).
74. For extensive discussion of the ex post facto prohibition and its history in U.S. jurisprudence, see
Weaver, 450 U.S, at 28-31; PEER W. Low ET AL, CRIMINAL LAW 39-41 (2d. ed. 1986); and
Extraterritorial Application of Criminal Law, 85 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoC. 383 (1991).
75. See Sarah Newland, Note, The Mercy of Scalia: Statutory Construction and the Rule of Lenity, 29
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 197-99 (1994).
76. For a description of the evolution of the principle of legality in the American legal system, see
Low ET AL., supra note 74, at 36-45. Low et al. define the principle of legality as "the desirability in
principle of advance legislative specification of criminal conduct." Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted). They
explain that this Enlightenment conception slowly took hold in the American legal system because it
competed against the English common law tradition, which provided for common law crimes. See id. at
36; see also Steven B. Duke, Criminal Procedure Commentary-Legality in tie Second Circuit, 49 BROOK.
L. REV. 911, 911 (1983) (describing the retroactivity, void-for-vagueness, and rule of lenity doctrines as
supporting the principle of legality).
77. See id. at 36-45.
78. The U.S. codification requirement may actually be somewhat stricter than international law
requires. One possible justification for a looser ex post facto requirement was made in the context of the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, amid the controversy over whether they were fairly punishing individuals
without prior warning of criminality. Because all people everywhere are prohibited from engaging in these
egregious abuses of human rights, it was argued, ex post facto concerns should not arise in these contexts.
Offenders should know that violations of these foundational norms are not acceptable and that prosecution
of them is possible. For example, this reasoning was used with regard to crimes against peace at the
Nuremberg tribunal:
[T]he maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a
principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust to punish those who in defiance of treaties and
assurances have attacked neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such
circumstances the attacker must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust
to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished.
In re Goerring, 13 Ann. Dig. 203, 208 (Nuremberg, Int'l Mil. Trib. 1946).
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Although the United States regards as a crime the behavior comprising
serious human rights violations when it occurs within the United States, this
codification is insufficient to create jurisdiction for these abuses abroad. The
United States crimrinalizes many of the behaviors that are component parts of
human rights abuses through domestic statutes against murder, assault and
battery, rape, etc. This existing codification eliminates a concern that criminals
might think that the United States would regard their actions as legally
permitted despite being morally reprehensible.79 The courts still would not
allow prosecution for these component crimes, however, due to the strong
prohibition against applying laws extraterritorially without specific statutory
authorization.8"
Despite the strict codification requirement, Congress can incorporate
international law directly into the statutory regime. U.S. courts have repeatedly
accepted statutes that rely on customary international law to define terms
within them. In its 1820 decision United States v. Smith,"' for example, the
Supreme Court upheld a statute which used the law of nations to define piracy.
Similarly, Ex parte Quirin8 2 relied on Smith to allow a presidentially
established military tribunal to try people for World War II violations of the
law of war. Analogously, in domestic contexts courts have reaffirmed the
principle that undefined terms in criminal statutes will be given their common
law meaning if such a meaning exists.8 3
The previous discussion of prosecution should be distinguished from the
U.S. approach to extradition. Although a double criminality requirement exists
(the offense must be a crime in both states) in order for extradition to occur,'
Further extending this reasoning, a student note explains that the cx post facto prohibition should not
apply to international crimes over which the United States has universal jurisdiction because people
committing these crimes have fair warning from the international community. See Eric S. Kobnck. Note,
The Ex Post Facto Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction over Internanonal Crimes. 87
COLUM. L. REv. 1515, 1529-30 (1987). Kobrick explains that an additional justification for the jurisdiction
of the Nuremberg Tribunal is based in the character of international law. Since no international legislature
exists, international criminal law originates from a gradual evolution. Applying the cx post facto prohibition
would thus thwart the growth of international criminal law. See id. at 1533.
While this reasoning provides some justification for why, as a mauer of international law. prosecution
might be acceptable, it does not address the domestic law difficulty. Because the codificauon requirement
is so deeply embedded in the U.S. legal system, overcoming the unfairness issue still would not make it
part of the written U.S. law.
79. The Sixth Circuit reinforced this reasoning by allowing, for the purposes of extradition, murder
to provide double criminality with regard to genocide. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky. 776 F2d 571. 582-83
(6th Cir. 1985); see also Monroe Leigh, Judicial Decisions, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 645, 656-58 (1986)
80. See Born, supra note 15, at 1.
81. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 157-63 (1820).
82. 317 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1942).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957); Jerome v. Unted States. 318 U S
101, 108 n.6 (1943).
84. See PAUST ET AL., supra note 25, at 328-29 (describing the contours of the U.S double cnminality
requirement). The U.S. extradition process involves a preliminary hearing regarding bail, followed by an
extradition hearing examining the identity of the offender, whether the charges meet the double criminality
requirement, whether probable cause exists, and whether there are any grounds for denying cxtradition.
Appeal mechanisms are limited. See id. at 287-95.
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the United States has found criminalization of the underlying behavior
sufficient to meet the requirement. The Sixth Circuit in particular has
recognized another nation's criminal jurisdiction with regard to human rights
violations even when no explicit statutory or treaty basis for such jurisdiction
exists. In an appeal from an extradition order against John Demjanjuk, for
example, whom Israel sought for alleged participation in Nazi genocide, the
court accepted Israeli jurisdiction over genocide on universal grounds and U.S.
double criminality based on the prohibition of murder.85 Since the Genocide
Convention does not provide for universal national jurisdiction, the customary
international law prohibition is the only ground upon which the "court could
have rested its recognition of Israeli jurisdiction. 6
II. POLICY REASONS FOR EXPANDING NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICrION
Having traced the evolution of national criminal jurisdiction under
international and U.S. law, this Note now turns to an exploration of policy
justifications and limitations. In large part, the jurisdictional expansion has
resulted from changed views of national sovereignty under human rights
doctrine. As international law increasingly has recognized that some norms
transcend national borders, governments can no longer lend legitimacy to
terrible abuses.8 7 With this shift, a need for institutional enforcement
structures has arisen. The practical limitations of the international system,
which lacks accessible, effective judicial forums and enforcement mechanisms,
have reinforced the need to use national courts. 8 Together, these
developments have changed the conception of national courts' role in the
enforcement of international human rights.
This description, however, does not fully capture the complexities of the
U.S. approach to punishing human rights offenders and allowing redress for
victims. The criminal measures are formed against the backdrop of a
well-established civil regime under the ATCA."9 While criminality adds a
dimension of individual accountability that goes beyond civil torts, it also
potentially could harm the civil regime. Traditionally, when criminal and civil
suits address the same harms, the civil suit is stayed pending the end of the
85. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985).
86. As Judge Lively stated:
The underlying assumption is that the crimes are offenses against the law of nations or against
humanity and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all nations. This being so, Israel or any
other nation, regardless of its status in 1942 or 1943, may undertake to vindicate the interest
of all nations by seeking to punish the perpetrators of such crimes.
Id.
87. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 564-80 (discussing the development of human rights
norms).
88. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of
Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 37, 42-44 (1990).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
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criminal prosecution.9" If this happens whenever the U.S. government is
considering a human rights prosecution, particularly if these criminal measures
are not brought rapidly, victims may be less able to gain monetary redress
through using the ATCA. On a policy level, therefore, a careful balancing is
necessary to ensure that expansion of criminal jurisdiction does not undermine
the potentially more effective human rights civil suits. This part and the next
one consider the policy justifications for and potential problems of criminal
jurisdictional expansion.
A. The Need to Enforce Universal Norms
The previously described evolution of national criminal jurisdiction
occurred in the context of changing notions of states' roles within the
international community. Traditionally, states governed all activity within their
borders. International law was conducted between states and bound them as the
primary actors.9 These sovereign states generally served as the enforcers of
international law.92 In dealing with "enemies of mankind" who violated
foundational norms, the nation apprehending them would either prosecute
them, or extradite them to another interested nation.93 Even following World
War I, when the first efforts to establish an international criminal tribunal
began, prosecutions of war criminals occurred in domestic courts.'
With the development of the international human rights regime, state
sovereignty diminished. Universal jurisdiction was no longer confined to
violations on the high seas, but rather extended to behavior occurring purely
within a state's borders. International law began to recognize that some norms
were so fundamental that they could not be legally violated anywhere and that
all nations had jurisdiction over their violation.9" This expansion has created
90. See infra notes 143-145 and accompanying text
91. Ian Brownlie describes the international law conception of the sovereignty and equality of states
as having three main components: jurisdiction over their ternitory and permanent population, a duty not to
intervene with other states' exclusive jurisdictions, and the recognition that international law obligations
depend on sovereign consent. See BROWNLIE, supra note 8. at 287
92. See Randall, supra note 8, at 791-800.
93. See id.
94. For a discussion of the almost nonexistent pre-Nuremberg international prosecution efforts, see
PAUST ET AL., supra note 25, at 707-10.
95. Numerous scholars have described the evoluuon of the modem human rights regime See. e g
BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 564-80 (discussing the development of human rights norms). JACK DONNELLY.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (1993) (discussing the emergence of human rights norms within political
constraints); HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES (Theodor Mieron ed.,
1984) (compiling a scholarly discussion of global and regional human rights issues), HUM.IAN RIGHTS IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds, 1993)
(compiling a scholarly analysis of numerous human rights norms); RICHARD B LiLucIH. lNTERATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE (2d ed 1991) (analyzing a variety of human
rights problems); MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBUC ORDER THE BASIC
POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUmIAN DIGNITY (1980) (discussing various human rights
protections). For a discussion of the evolution of universal jurisdiction in particular, see generally Randall.
supra note 8.
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jurisdictional rights and enforcement needs that did not exist previously. Since
some level of state complicity often underlies severe human rights violations,
the state with the greatest number of connections to the violation is not
necessarily the best place for prosecution or a place in which prosecution
would be likely to occur.96 The concurrent growth of international commerce
has increased the likelihood that any given incident has transnational
implications.97 The international system, however, still lacks the institutional
capability to enforce its standards.
These developments have created the need for national criminal
jurisdiction to enforce human rights norms. In order for human rights
protections to have any real meaning, they must be enforced; if violators
escape punishment, the prohibitions are merely declaratory. While international
resolution of these universal norm violations might be ideal, the limitations of
international mechanisms make such an approach unlikely in the foreseeable
future.9" Given that human rights violations are of a universal character,
prosecution in any adequate national judicial forum is acceptable, even if not
preferable. Until international mechanisms develop much further or states begin
to hold their officials who violate human rights accountable, neutral state
prosecution remains one of the only mechanisms for enforcing international
norms. Since the international community views fundamental human rights as
norms so important that they should be subject to national criminal jurisdiction,
nations have an international law basis and obligation to prosecute offenders.
B. Limitations of International Criminal Mechanisms
The need for enforcement of international human rights norms explains
why national jurisdiction has grown as international human rights law has
developed. Due to the limitations of international institutions, national courts
often provide the only effective method of implementation. The International
Court of Justice allows only for states to bring claims against other states,
greatly limiting the standing of human rights victims and making prosecution
96. In describing reasons that international tribunals could be useful, U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Stevcn
Lepper explained that "when the state itself is responsible for the crimes, it may not be appropriate to allow
it to prosecute the offenders." Panel, Identifying and Prosecuting War Crimes: 71vo Case Studies-The
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 631, 654-55 (1996) [hereinafter War Crimes
Case Studies] (remarks of Lt. Col. Lepper).
97. For a discussion of the growth of international commerce and the resulting legal questions, see
JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AND COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-9 (1992).
98. Numerous scholars and policymakers have discussed the many difficulties that arise in trying to
enforce international norms and the importance of enforcing them. See, e.g., RICHARD B. LILLICH,
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING UNITED STATES LAW IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY (1981) (discussing enforcement issues); REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON AN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Alaire Bretz Rioeffel ed., 1994) (hereinafter TASK
FORCE REPORT] (discussing the state of development of plans for an international criminal court); Michelle
Leighton Schwartz, International Legal Protection for Victims of Environmental Abuse, i8 YALE J. INT'L
L. 355 (1993) (discussing difficulties that victims have obtaining redress).
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of individuals impossible. 99 Although international and regional human rights
tribunals provide for greater involvement of private actors, they (unlike a
national criminal prosecution supported by a police and jail system) have little
power to enforce any sort of substantive penalty." There have been some
efforts at ad hoc and systematic international criminal prosecution. The
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and for the Far East provided
for adjudication of World War II atrocities, the Yugoslav and Rwandan
Tribunals are trying to address the violations in those countries, and a draft
statute exists for an international criminal court.'0 ' As discussed in more
detail below, however, none of these efforts has provided a comprehensive
solution to criminal prosecution of human rights offenders, and each of them
assumes the existence of supplementary national prosecution. Thus national
court jurisdiction is necessary to ensure that human rights offenders are
prosecuted with enforceable judgments.
The international community first began to discuss international criminal
prosecution following World War I. Despite articles of the Treaty of Versailles
providing for an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II and other war
criminals and the establishment of investigatory committees, no such tribunal
was ever established, and prosecutions occurred in national courts. The League
of Nations made an effort to create an international criminal tribunal to enforce
the 1937 terrorism convention, but it failed with the League.1'1
2
Following World War II, the victors established the International Military
Tribunals at Nuremberg and for the Far East through treaties. These
transnational tribunals, still supplemented by national courts, prosecuted
egregious human rights violations that occurred during the war, including
genocide, war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity' 0 '
In addition to these ad hoc efforts, the U.N. General Assembly in 1947
mandated that the International Law Commission (ILC) create a statute for an
international criminal court and a codification of offenses."° Despite the
ILC's creation of the draft code of offenses in 1954, however, the United
Nations did not begin to move forward significantly with the project until
1989, in part due to the Cold War.05 After many years of work by the ILC
99. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 34, para. I. 59 Stat. 1055. 1059 (1945) ("Only
states may be parties in cases before the Court."). In addition to these standing lumits. the court has
jurisdiction only if states commit to compulsory jurisdicuon or a convention provides for it See id art. 36,
59 Stat. at 1060.
100. See generally HENKIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 26-42 (discussing enforcement of international
law).
101. See infra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
102. For a description of these post-World War I developments, see M Chenf Bassiouni. Esrablislung
an International Criminal Court: Historical SurveY. 149 MIL. L REV 49. 51-55 (1995) See al5o PAUST
ET AL., supra note 25, at 844-45.
103. For a discussion of the Nuremberg and Far East Tribunals. see PAUST [-r At.. supra note 25. at
710-23. See also Bassiouni, supra note 102, at 55-56.
104. See Bassiouni, supra note 102, at 58.
105. See PAUST ET AL., supra note 25, at 84447; Bassiouni. supra note 102, at 56-63
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and an American Bar Association task force to develop the framework for such
a body, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution in 1992 requesting that
the ILC provide a draft statute for an international criminal court."°
The creation of the ad hoc Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals has helped
push forward the international criminal court project. Unlike the post-World
War II tribunals constituted through multilateral agreement, -these are truly
international tribunals developed through U.N. Security Council Resolutions.
The establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal, especially followed by the United
Nation's structural improvements in its creation of the Rwandan tribunal,
indicated the international community's institutional capability to create a
permanent criminal tribunal."0 7
Despite the increased optimism and progress that have followed, however,
an international criminal court still does not exist. Although a draft statute and
report were completed in 1993 and the U.S. Senate called for advancement of
such a court, many unsettled issues of substantive reach and procedure
remained.'08 An ad hoc committee in 1995 and a preparatory committee in
1996 failed to produce a consolidated draft statute despite their efforts. A
1997-1998 preparatory committee is continuing the project to create a
draft.'09 Even assuming that these issues are finally resolved and a court is
constituted, the ICC will still have to sort out over time its identity in the
international community. Thus, while an international criminal court would
help address some of the institutional inadequacies of the international system,
106. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of the Forty-Fourth Session, U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/584 (1992) (proposing a General Assembly Resolution);
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Observations Concerning the 1997-98 Preparatory Cotmnittee's Work, 25 DENY. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 397, 399 (1997) (describing passage of the resolution); see also TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 98, at 4.
107. For a tracing of this interactive history, see PAUST ET AL., supra note 25, at 844-57. Many
scholars and policymakers have discussed these tribunals. Much analysis compares the Yugoslav and
Rwandan tribunals. See War Crimes Case Studies, supra note 96 (providing prosecutorial, governmental,
and nongovernmental organizational perspectives on issues of identification and approach in prosecuting
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity); Mark R. Von Steinberg, A Comparison of the
Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals: Universal Jurisdiction and the "Elementary Dictates
of Humanity," 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 111 (1996) (comparing subject matter jurisdiction, violations
involved, and the approach of the United Nations). Other sources discuss the progress of the Yugoslav
tribunal thus far. See SECTION OF INT'L LAW AND PRACTICE, ABA, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED RULES OF
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (Karen Tucker ed., 1995) [hereinafter PROPOSED RULES] (describing the work of
the Task Force, the state of the proposed rules, and areas for further resolution); Ruth Wedgewood, War
Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International War Crimes Tribunal, 34 VA. J. INT'L
L. 267 (1994) (describing three obstacles to the effectiveness of the Yugoslav tribunal: U.N. unwillingness,
the absence of relevant legal sources, and the political ramifications upon the peace process), Still others
analyze the Rwandan Tribunal and the progress that it represents. See Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the
Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The International Criminal Tribunal for Rivanda, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 421
(1994) (providing background on the Rwandan tribunal and analyzing its legal innovations); Payam
Akhavan, Current Development, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and
Pragmatics of Punislunent, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501 (1996) (describing the history of the Rwandan tribunal
and comparing it to the Yugoslav tribunal).
108. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 4.
109. See Bassiouni, supra note 106, at 399-402.
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it is not clear exactly when such a body will begin to exist and function
effectively.
Even when (or if) an international criminal court does come into existence,
it will not eliminate the need for national prosecution. For example, although
many agree that financial sanctions would be inadequate, imprisonment raises
logistical difficulties not found within a national prison and court system."'
The proposed International Criminal Court (ICC) thus may not be able to
provide a full enforcement of decisions, leaving a gap for national courts with
their established criminal enforcement mechanisms to fill. Additionally, the
ICC's inherent subject-matter jurisdiction currently includes only aggression,
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes;' many severe human
rights violations, such as torture, thus are not included directly.
More importantly, the ICC is being formulated to have concurrent
jurisdiction with states' courts. The relationship between the ICC and national
courts has been characterized by the word "complementarity."' "2 Although
the precise meaning of this term has been much disputed, it seems to indicate
that states should have some say in how the ICC seizes a matter. Further
debate has occurred over whether the ICC will have primacy over national
courts.' 3 The existence of concern about jurisdictional interaction reinforces
that the ICC is not intended to supplant entirely national jurisdiction over
international human rights matters.
C. The Incompleteness of National Civil Jurisdiction
At a first view of U.S. law, one might wonder why a criminal human
rights regime is even necessary. After all, the civil regime for addressing
severe human rights violations is quite well developed. Since the Second
Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala"4 to allow a noncitizen to sue
another noncitizen for torture that occurred in Paraguay, U.S. courts have
allowed numerous suits against human rights offenders under the ATCA" 5
for customary international law violations. The TVPA" 6 and the amendment
of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act" 7 through the Antiterrorism and
110. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 37-39
111. See Bassiouni, supra note 106, at 411.
112. For complementarity analysis, see id. at 411-12; and Lara Ballard. The US, the ICC. and the
Bottom Line: The Recognition and Enforcement of lnternatonal Criminal Court Judgrnent in U S Courts.
29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 16-17. on file with the Yale La%
Journal).
113. See Bassiouni, supra note 106, at 409-10.
114. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
116. Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Sit 73 (1992) For discussion of the
impact of the TVPA, see Rachael E. Schwartz, "And Tomorrow'
" 
The Torture Victun Protection Act, I I
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 271 (1994); and Kathryn L. Pryor, Note. Doe5 the Torture Victim Protection
Act Signal the himinent Demise of the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 29 VA J INT'L L 969 (1989)
117. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330. 1602-1611 (West Supp 1997)
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Effective Death Penalty Act of 199618 have reinforced this regime
statutorily.
The ATCA, a relic of the Judiciary Act of 1789,"' provides U.S. district
courts with "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."' 20 This Act has been found to provide a cause of action for
customary international law violations abroad, including torture;'2 ' prolonged
arbitrary detention; summary execution; disappearances;" cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment (when constitutionally proscribed);'
2 5
genocide; and war crimes. 121 Since the torts being adjudicated often have no
connection to the American forum, the only applicable jurisdictional base is
universal. Thus, in the civil context, universal jurisdiction through an
implementing statute has been used to allow foreign plaintiffs to obtain
judgments against foreign defendants based on customary international law.
This jurisprudence has not expanded in a completely unfettered way. Until
the passage of the TVPA, the D.C. Circuit's 1984 decision in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic'27 called into question the viability of the ATCA as
a litigation tool." In addition, ATCA monetary awards have been difficult
to enforce; very few of the judgments have proved collectible thus far. 29
Thus victories have been largely symbolic and have resulted in little restitution
for the victims.
Moreover, the range of possible defendants is unclear, but likely limited
in a way that prevents comprehensive relief. Based on the Second Circuit's
118. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 (West Supp. 1997) (creating a human rights exception to sovereign
immunity).
119. Ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
120. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (1994).
121. Filartiga serves as the lead case in the ATCA jurisprudence, clarifying that the statute provides
a cause of action for official torture as a violation of the law of nations. See 630 F.2d at 881-85. Numerous
opinions have followed Filartiga and held that official torture violates the law of nations. See, e.g., Kadic
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995); In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475-76 (9th Cir.
1994); Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 716 (9th Cir. 1992); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963
F.2d 332, 336 (lith Cir. 1992); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 177, 185 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp.
1531, 1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
122. See Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1541-42 (establishing prolonged arbitrary detention as actionable under
the ATCA); Femandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 901-04 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (establishing that
prolonged arbitrary detention violates international law and mentioning Filartiga as an example of courts'
recognizing customary international law violations).
123. See Forti, 672 F. Supp. at 1542.
124. See Forti, 694 F. Supp. at 709.
125. See Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. at 184-89.
126. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242-43. For an in-depth analysis of the ATCA jurisprudence, see B'TH
STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS LITOATION IN U.S. COURTS (1996). See
also Osofsky, supra note 42 (manuscript at 19-34) (tracing the ATCA recognition of these norms).
127. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
128. See id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring) (claiming that Act does not provide a cause of action).
129. See STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 126, at 218-24. In a criminal prosecution, in contrast, often
the state has custody of the offender and can thus enforce judgment by imposing imprisonment.
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decision in Kadic v. Karadzic,30 probably only certain offenses constitute
human rights violations when committed by private actors.' 3 ' On the other
end of the spectrum, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 2 even with its
recent amendment to allow a very limited human rights exception to
immunity, 133 has served as a bar to most human rights suits brought directly
against foreign states." Even with these obstacles, however, the United
States has provided many human rights victims with a forum for civil redress.
Despite the existence of strong civil law remedies in the United States,
they cannot and are not meant to play the same role as criminal prosecution.
Civil law focuses fundamentally on one person's compensating another for a
wrong committed. With the exception of punitive damages (which are more
criminal in character), civil law penalties attempt mainly to make the victim
whole. 35 Criminal prosecution, in contrast, focuses on punishing the offender
rather than on providing the victim with redress. Theorists justify the
importance and appropriateness of such punishment on the grounds of
retribution, protecting social norms, and enhancing social utility in various
ways.
136
Both types of legal sanctions have roles to play in human rights protection.
Victims should be able to gain compensation when they have suffered terrible
harms. Although no amount of money can make them as they were before,
civil damage awards can aid physical and psychological healing. A nation also
should be able to acknowledge egregious human rights abuses as offenses
against both the international community and its own social order. Criminal
punishment serves the role of reinforcing foundational global values and, one
would hope, of providing a deterrent. Material compensation of the victim does
not indicate fully the destructiveness of human rights violations to the fabric
of society or the need to indicate the intolerability of the offender's behavior.
Thus, even if human rights violations are offenses against the foundational
norms of the international community, neither a civil or criminal remedy alone
can address comprehensively all of the damaging aspects.
130. 70 F.3d 232 (2d. Cir. 1995).
131. See id. at 238-44. The opinion analyzes only a few offenses. laving the state actor requirement
ambiguous for numerous other human rights violations. See id.
132. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (West Supp. 1997).
133. See Antiterrorism Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Star_ 1214. 1241-43 (1996)
(codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(7) (West Supp. 1997))
134. Cf Har M. Osofsky, Foreign Sovereign lnniuny fromn Severe Human Rights Volatot. New
Directions for Cormnon Law Based Approaches, II N.Y. INT'L L. REV (forthcoming 1998) (on file with
the Yale Law Journal) (proposing a systematic approach to foreign sovereign immunity and human rights)
135. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRTS 863-64 (6th ed 1995) (discussing
this theory of damages).
136. For a description of these theories of punishment, see 4 Ecct.oiotA OF CRWME AND JUSTICE
1337-46 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). See also HymAN GROSS. A THEORY OF CRI INAL JUsTcE 6-33
(1979) (discussing varying conceptualizations of criminal jusuce); C.L. Ten, Positive Retrbutivtsm. Soc
PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 194, 200-08 (describing theories of punishment as -penance" and
"deterrence").
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III. POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF BROADER NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Unfortunately, expanding national criminal jurisdiction has a number of
potential downsides. If a criminal act occurs in a country other than the United
States, the nation with territorial jurisdiction may claim that U.S. prosecution
invades its sovereign control over its territory regardless of the international
community's recognition of universal jurisdiction. It may argue that the United
States lacks sufficient ties to the wrong to become legitimately involved.
Within the United States, an expanding criminal regime may cause massive
delays in parallel civil suits, denying already victimized people swift redress.
Beyond these structural problems, practical difficulties abound. The appropriate
scope of national criminalization is unclear, reflecting the ambiguity of
international law. In addition, human rights victims and nongovernmental
organizations may face cumbersome bureaucratic hurdles in attempting to
convince the government to initiate criminal proceedings. This part explores
these difficulties, each of which must be addressed to achieve a comprehensive
and effective human rights regime in the United States.
A. Sovereignty and Legitimacy Concerns
Almost all applications of universal jurisdiction conflict with assertions of
sovereignty. Except for hypothetical human rights violations that occur in the
middle of the high seas on floating pieces of wood that belong to no nation,
abuses are committed within the territory of a nation. Given the strength of the
territorial principle of jurisdiction, the nation in which the harm occurred
usually has some interest in it regardless of whether it is too complicit to
provide a fair prosecution. Thus, when a country takes jurisdiction on universal
grounds over events occurring in another nation, this grant probably impinges
upon the territorial interests of that other country and therefore upon its
sovereign realm.
37
Although many human rights abuses, as a matter of international law,
provide a basis for universal jurisdiction, they still involve a particular person
harming another in a particular place, sometimes with the purpose of
promoting a policy objective. Given the four bases of jurisdiction in addition
to universal jurisdiction, the jurisdictional ties of some forums to such behavior
will be stronger than those of others.'38 When a nation with weaker ties to
the abuse takes jurisdiction, it indicates that it considers itself a more
appropriate forum. Unless its reasons for assuming jurisdiction are particularly
sound (such as the lack of a more appropriate forum in which the suit might
137. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 8, at 287-97 (discussing state sovereignty).
138. See supra text accompanying note 8.
[Vol. 107: 191
Domesticating International Criminal Law
proceed), the trial may raise international questions of legitimacy, the universal
base for jurisdiction notwithstanding.'
39
All of these issues become particularly acute in the criminal context
because, as the Supreme Court indicated in a case involving human rights
violations, police power is "peculiarly sovereign in nature."'" One of the
most fundamental functions of a state is to make law and punish its breach.
When one state interferes with criminal violations of another state's law
occurring in that other state, it opens itself to sovereignty and legitimacy
criticisms. 4' Thus any policy decision to expand jurisdiction must proceed
in a way that minimizes sovereignty concerns and maximizes legitimacy.
B. Risk of Undermining the Civil Regime
The comprehensive approach to civil and criminal jurisdiction proposed
above will work only if the United States exercises its prosecution power in
an expeditious and minimally interfering way. Parallel proceedings can cause
many difficulties for both the criminal and the civil suit. A defendant's success
in the civil suit may depend on the provision of information that could
undermine Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Meanwhile, the
withholding of information to protect those rights in the criminal suit may
affect a civil defense adversely. Because the civil and criminal proceedings are
likely to be dealing with interrelated issues, holding them simultaneously also
might cause inefficiencies and slow down both proceedings.-"
To address these issues, civil suits are often stayed until the ternmination
of criminal proceedings. As the Supreme Court said in United States v.
Kordel,'43 "Federal courts have deferred civil proceedings pending the
completion of parallel criminal prosecutions when the interests of justice
seemed to require such an action, sometimes at the request of the
prosecution ... sometimes at the request of the defense."'- In applying this
balancing test, courts generally stay civil proceedings when the two suits
involve the "same matter" and a "serious offense."'4 5 Since human rights
139. See, e.g., supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text (describing the controversy over Yun )
140. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349. 361 (1993).
141. See id.
142. For a detailed examination of the difficulues of parallel civil and criminal proceedings. see Note.
Using Equitable Powers To Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions. 98 HARV L REV 1023
(1985). For a discussion of how civil and crminal actions can become intertwined, see Campbell v
Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1962), in which a civil action for a tax refund was closely tied to
a criminal prosecution for fraud.
143. 397 U.S. 1 (1969).
144. Id. at 12 n.27.
145. SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376 (1980) The opinion clarifies that stays are not
constitutionally required, see id. at 1375, but states:
Other than where there is specific evidence of agency bad faith or malicious governmental
tactics, the strongest case for defemng civil proceedings until after completion of criminal
proceedings is where a party under indictment for a senous offense is required to defend a civil
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violations are very serious crimes and would arise out of the same behavior as
the parallel ATCA suits, a civil stay seems probable.
The nature of human rights violations creates the risk that civil stays could
be particularly lengthy and thus burdensome. A prosecutor generally requests
a stay when an indictment looks likely. As Alan Tieger, prosecutor at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia from 1994 to 1996,
stated, the investigation in a complex international human rights prosecution
probably will be longer than in a domestic criminal one.' 46 First, the scale
is typically different; investigators often must address a widespread pattern of
abuse. In addition, he indicated that the dispersion of witnesses means that
numerous governments may be involved in the production and discovery of
evidence. Finally, the offenders may not be in the United States when grand
juries indict them, causing further delays. 47
Thus, while a normal delay from a civil stay rarely would last much more
than a year, delays in the human rights context could conceivably amount to
several years. One can imagine a situation in which the civil suit is stayed
pending the resolution of possible prosecution, which is stayed in turn pending
the determination of a foreign court or tribunal. Although the criminal
mechanism provides an important tool of punishment unavailable under ATCA
suits, its expansion could damage the civil law regime by making the
completion of such suits more difficult. While international law and the need
for completeness suggest the value of an expanded criminal regime, it will
increase justice only if it does not reduce opportunities for redress.
C. Ambiguities of International Law
Due to the evolution of international law described in Part I, some human
rights treaties provide for national criminal jurisdiction and some do not. While
the universality of the prohibition against genocide is as well (or even better)
developed in customary international law as the norm against torture, the
Torture Convention provides much more extensive jurisdiction than does the
Genocide Convention. 48 The U.S. statutory regime reflects this disparity in
treaty law. Statutory criminal jurisdiction includes torture, hostage taking,
aircraft terrorism and hijacking, but not genocide, war crimes, or crimes
or administrative action involving the same matter. The noncriminal proceeding, if not deferred,
might undermine the party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, expand rights
of criminal discovery beyond the limits of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b), expose
the basis of the defense to the prosecution in advance of criminal trial, or otherwise prejudice
the case. If delay of the noncriminal proceeding would not seriously injure the public interest,
a court may be justified in deferring it.
Id. at 1375-76.
146. Telephone Interview with Alan Tieger, Special Investigative Counsel, Department of Justice (Aug.
22, 1997).
147. See id.
148. See supra Section II.A.
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against humanity.'49 Because explicit congressional authorization is the only
viable basis for criminal prosecution, comprehensive and equal justice for
victims of these similarly unacceptable atrocities is currently unlikely.
In order to expand the U.S. regime with regard to customary international
law norms, Congress must try to establish when universal jurisdiction should
become part of the criminal code. As discussed further in Section IV.B, the
lack of consensus beyond the most clearly established norms conveying
universal jurisdiction would make establishing a truly comprehensive schema
quite difficult. This lack of consensus stems from difficulties in ascertaining
the state of customary international law due to its inherently ambiguous nature.
The ATCA civil law regime, which to date is based entirely on customary
international law, reflects these difficulties; the courts have yet to develop a
precise methodology for determining when norms fall within their reach.'
Since determinations of customary international law are based on a compilation
of evidence that is highly susceptible to interpretation, an appropriate,
comprehensive justice may be limited further by confusion or disagreement
about which international criminal law violations deserve national
jurisdiction.' 5'
D. Difficulties of Accessing Prosecution
Assuming that the above problems have been overcome, the nature of
prosecution itself provides a further obstacle to obtaining justice in such cases.
Unlike a civil suit in which anyone may bring a claim, only representatives of
the executive branch (generally U.S. Attorneys) have the authority to prosecute
criminals federally.' 52 In order to initiate a prosecution against a torturer who
happens to be visiting or residing in the United States, people who represent
the government must be convinced to bring the case. Even if the government
agrees to prosecute, the bureaucratic processes involved may be slower than
simply filing a civil suit.' 53 These practical difficulties pose particularly
challenging obstacles when the offender is within the United States for only
a brief period of time. By the time an indictment is obtained, the offender may
be abroad and difficult to bring back to the United States.
149. See supra Section II.B.
150. Scholarly discussion of the requirements for norms under the ATCA tends to take the form of
stating the ambiguous international law standards. See, e.g.. STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 126, at 49-
62; see also Osofsky, supra note 42 (manuscript at 11-34) (proposing a framework for approaching new
norms in the ATCA context).
151. See PAUST ET AL., supra note 25, at 3-15 (discussing various sources and approaches to
international criminal law).
152. See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMIINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1-11
(6th ed. 1995) (describing the initiation of a criminal case).
153. Criminal prosecution generally involves investigation, arrest, possible pre-inal release, plea. tral,
and sentencing. For felonies, a grand jury indictment occurs after arrest but before tral. See id.
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The experience of human rights advocates in the United Kingdom
illustrates this difficulty. Like the United States, the United Kingdom passed
a criminal statute implementing its obligations under the Torture Convention.
Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act of 198815' allows a criminal action
against a "public official or person acting in official capacity whatever his
nationality" for committing torture in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. 55
The main limitation upon proceedings is that they require the consent of the
Attorney General for England and Wales, the Attorney General for Northern
Ireland, or the Solicitor General, depending on the specific case.'
56
Because of this requirement, any analysis of the U.K. Act, other than of
the difficulties in bringing cases under it, is almost entirely theoretical at this
time. When General Augusto Pinochet of Chile visited the United Kingdom in
1994, human rights groups requested that the Attorney General prosecute
him,157 but the government asked for more evidence, and Pinochet left before
further steps could be taken. 58 While more attempts to invoke the Act may
occur in the future, the fact that this law has remained dormant for nine years
despite the efforts of advocates suggests that governmental involvement in the
criminal process may greatly limit opportunities for such prosecutions. If the
bureaucratic obstacles in the United States are at all similar, even existing
statutory regimes with explicit statutory jurisdiction may not lead to extensive
prosecution. The paucity of prosecutions to date under the existing laws
granting criminal jurisdiction related to human rights may reflect some of these
constraints.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN INTEGRATED NATIONAL APPROACH
The previous part's discussion of policy issues raises several normative
questions: How should the U.S. government approach the prosecution of
international human rights crimes? What range of abuses should it codify?
When should prosecutors and courts make the discretionary decision to
exercise the existing criminal jurisdiction? One answer to these questions,
based on realism and sovereignty concerns, is that the United States should do
whatever the international community decides. This answer begins with the
premise that international law arises through the voluntary agreement of states
154. Criminal Justice Act of 1988, ch. 33, § 134.
155. Id.
156. See id. § 135. The Code for Crown Prosecutors describes in detail the criteria for instituting
criminal proceedings: sufficiency of admissible and reliable evidence to afford realistic prospect of
conviction. See generally, e.g., Charging the Right Driving Offence, 146 NEw L.J. 414 (1996) (describing
these criteria).
157. See Hella Pick, Scotland Yard Investigating Pinochet Torture Clamns, GUARDIAN (London), June
15, 1994, at 8.
158. See Annika Savill, Inside File: Pinochet's Shopping Spree Gets Greetn Light in Britain, INDEP.
(London), June 16, 1997, at 11.
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over time. Since universal jurisdiction involves a ceding of states' territorial
control, states should determine what offenses should be prosecutable and how
much other states should be able to punish them. Under this view, a state's
national criminal jurisdiction is appropriate when its exercise reflects both the
obligations and limitations accepted by that state as a member of the
international community.159
Although this first answer accurately reflects international law, it
effectively sidesteps the normative question. States should follow international
law and do have the power to create it, but what approach should they take in
subjecting human rights offenders to national criminal jurisdiction? When
should they exercise the jurisdiction that international law gives them? The
following sections address these foundational questions by proposing that
Congress create a statute to criminalize severe human rights violations and that
prosecutors follow a comparative forum conveniens approach to exercising
their discretion.
A. Comprehensive Criminal Codification
This section proposes that Congress statutorily criminalize well-defined
human rights violations over which universal jurisdiction clearly exists
internationally. Such an approach is necessary to address the sovereignty and
legitimacy concerns detailed above in Section III.A. If a terrible wrong
occurring in another country does not actually violate international law and
therefore constitute an international crime, the United States would be
impinging on another state's internal policing were it to exercise jurisdiction
and prosecute. Even when the government in the place of occurrence supports
the abuse in question and is unlikely ever to prosecute, the United States has
grounds for interference only if a basis for jurisdiction exists. While
nationality, passive personality, and protective principle connections to the
harm may give the United States additional legitimacy for its claim in some
instances, in other circumstances human rights violations occurring abroad do
not deserve U.S. criminal jurisdiction unless it is clearly established that they
provide a universal jurisdictional basis for prosecution by national courts.
A comparison between civil and criminal jurisdiction further reinforces this
point. In a civil trial, the government is a neutral party that simply provides a
forum for adjudication and enforcement. When the United States allows suits
against foreign human rights violators under the ATCA, it is merely assuring
that private parties have a place to determine compensation for wrongs."w In
a criminal context, however, the United States is a real party of interest in the
159. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 8. at 287-97 (dtscussing state sovereignty)
160. Even in the civil ATCA context, there still is a requirement of a customary inteaulional law or
treaty violation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
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suit. The fact that the executive is prosecuting indicates that the harm
sufficiently impacts the foundational norms of society to be considered an
affront to the United States itself. 6 ' Given this active governmental role, it
becomes particularly critical that the issue involved provide a clear basis for
governmental involvement based on universal jurisdiction.
What violations fall into this category? Clearly, if an international
convention exists in which numerous nations have agreed to national criminal
jurisdiction, a right enumerated within the convention provides such a basis.
As described earlier, conventions with broad jurisdictional provisions exist with
respect to terrorism, torture, slavery and apartheid. 162 These violations are
thus the most obvious ones to include in a criminal statutory regime.
Even in the context of explicit treaty provisions, however, the United
States has not been particularly vigilant. Because the United States ratifies few
human rights treaties, it thus far has provided criminal statutes only for torture
and a variety of terrorist activities. 63 Its ratification and implementation of
the Torture Convention came six years after the United Kingdom's.'6 Hence,
U.S. implementation of universal jurisdiction in the human rights realm thus
far has lagged behind the international establishment of its appropriateness in
the treaty regime. Although recognizing these wrongs is a good start, the
United States should be more vigilant about timely ratification of future treaties
regarding international human rights criminal violations.
The more difficult dilemma occurs with respect to customary international
norms. As a domestic law matter, criminalization should not be controversial
since it has a basis in the U.S. Constitution. Article I grants Congress the
power to "define and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations."' 65
Since customary international law is essentially the modem successor to the
law of nations, this provision provides clear grounds for statutory authority.
The problems arise from international relations concerns and the difficulty
of defining the content of customary international law. To avoid raising
sovereignty and legitimacy complaints, a criminal regime must target only
those violations that are most clearly accepted in the international community
as providing a basis for universal jurisdiction. In another article, I address a
similar question with respect to human rights exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity, focusing on four criteria: whether the abuse violates an established
legal norm of the international community; whether international recognition
of national courts' jurisdiction exists; whether the norm has a clear,
161. This approach flows naturally from a theory in which punishment aims to protect morality and
deter heinous behavior. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
162. See supra Section I.A.
163. See supra Section I.B.
164. Compare supra notes 5-7, with supra note 154.
165. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Professor Louis Henkin discusses the limited judicial interpretation of
this provision in Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATEs CONSTITUTION 68-70 (2d ed.
1996).
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international definition; and whether the norm applies to all states." I
conclude that torture, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, slave
trade, piracy, and aircraft hijacking and attacks meet these four criteria. These
abuses all have been repudiated and clearly defined in international
conventions or through consistent state practice over many years.
International scholarship and U.S. policy produce very similar lists of
norms for which universal jurisdiction exists. Kenneth Randall, for example,
describes the reasonably high level of consensus regarding universal
jurisdiction over piracy, slave trade, war crimes, hijacking, hostage taking,
crimes against internationally protected persons, apartheid, torture, and
genocide, as well as the continuing debate over prolonged arbitrary detention
and disappearance. 6 7 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
recognizes universal jurisdiction over "piracy, slave trade, attacks on or
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of
terrorism,"'168 but notes that this is an expanding category.,69 The high level
of consensus regarding these particular acts thus suggests that criminalization
of them would not be internationally controversial.
Codifying these well-developed customary norms seems necessary for
basic justice and fairness; excluding norms not explicitly recognized by treaty
would devalue customary international law and treat equally well-established
violations dissimilarly. It also would ignore the civil jurisprudence under the
ATCA that recognizes a customary international law basis for universal
jurisdiction over a much wider range of offenses than the criminal statutory
regime currently encompasses. 7 ' Given that U.S. courts have recognized that
both genocide and torture provide a basis for universal jurisdiction in the civil
context, it is unjust that torturers currently can be criminally prosecuted, while
those who perpetrate genocide cannot.
This injustice is particularly profound given the limitations of international
and civil mechanisms. Unless the violations happened to have been committed
within the context of the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda and the perpetrator is
166. See Osofsky, supra note 134 (manuscript at 34-47).
167. See Randall, supra note 8, at 834-38; see also Osofsky. supra note 134 (manuscnpt at 34-47).
168. Id. § 404.
169. See id. § 404 cmt. a. Although it is the nonbinding expression of the American Law Institute, this
comment is helpful in elucidating how the United States views universal jurisdiction:
This section ... recognize[s] that international law permits any state to apply its laws to punish
certain offenses although the state has no links of territory with the offense, or of nationality
with the offender (or even the victim). Universal jurisdiction over the specified offenses is a
result of universal condemnation of those activities and general interest in cooperaing to
suppress them, as reflected in widely-accepted intemattonal agreements and resolutions of
international organizations. These offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of
customary law. Universal jurisdiction for additional offenses is provided by international
agreements, but it remains to be determined whether universal jurisdiction over a particular
offense has become customary law for states not party to such an agreement.
Id.
170. For a discussion of the extent of the civil regime, see supra Section ll.C
19971
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in the custody of these tribunals, the violation will not be prosecuted
internationally.' 71 While the civil law regime would allow a suit for money
damages, enforcement will be difficult and the international community's
interest in punishing the offender will not be realized. Thus, by limiting its
statutory regime to a few explicit treaty provisions, the United States is not
simply preventing prosecution in its courts, but is also severely diminishing the
likelihood that these egregious offenders will ever be brought to justice.
How should such a statute be constructed? Because of the need for fair
warning, criminal law must be much more precise than civil law. 72 An
appropriate statute, however, need not be terribly cumbersome. It simply
should specify which human rights norms it covers, define them by customary
international law, and indicate its reach beyond U.S. borders. The violations
specified in treaties or well-defined in customary international law would be
appropriate for inclusion; for each of them, international law provides a clear
basis for universal and thus U.S. jurisdiction. As mentioned previously,'73 the
approach of defining norms through customary international law is well-
established in U.S. jurisprudence. The statute that codifies violations not
already criminalized thus might read:
Genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, slave trade and
slavery, and apartheid as defined by customary international law shall
henceforth be considered federal crimes within the United States if the
act occurred in U.S. territory, if U.S. nationals were involved as
victims or offenders, if important national interests were threatened,
or if the offender is present in the United States. Offenders may be
sentenced to a maximum of life imprisonment.
17 1
This proposed language includes only the violations from the above list of
uncontroversial norms that have not already been codified. Although such a
law would need further refinement, this basic approach would provide for an
appropriately expanded criminal regime. As international law continues to
171. For a description of the limitations of international mechanisms, see supra Section II.B.
172. Thus, simply creating a much more specific criminal version of the ATCA-"Human rights
violations that constitute international crimes for which universal jurisdiction exists (either by customary
international law or a treaty of the United States) shall henceforth be considered federal crimes within the
United States if the act occurred in U.S. territory, if U.S. nationals were involved as victims or offenders,
if important national interests were threatened, or if the offender is present in the United States'-would
likely be too vague. The vagueness doctrine requires the striking down of statutes that are too imprecise.
See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-71 (1972) (striking down criminal law against
vagrancy on vagueness grounds); see also RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 43-57 (1997)
(discussing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), and subsequent development of vagueness doctrine).
173. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
174. This statute would differ from the act criminalizing torture in its exclusion of the death penalty.
The death penalty has been repudiated in the context of human rights. See Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doe. A/Res.44.128, 29 I.L.M. 1464 (1990). Given that U.S. law punishes heinous
criminal acts with the death penalty, however, parallelism to other statutes might dictate its inclusion as
a punishment for these violations or amendment of the other laws to exclude it.
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develop and additional offenses are added with time, the United States, to
avoid sovereignty and legitimacy concerns, should aim to include only well-
developed violations for which clear universal jurisdiction exists.
B. Prosecutorial Discretion: Comparative Forum Conveniens
Simply because a crime exists does not mean that criminal charges should
be brought. Nonprosecutorial discretion is a well-established executive
privilege. 175 In the context of severe human rights violations occurring
abroad, numerous situations might arise in which prosecution would be ill-
advised. A national forum with more ties to the harm may be preparing to
prosecute. An international tribunal like those established for the former
Yugoslavia or Rwanda may be created specifically to address these crimes.
The International Criminal Court may wish to initiate a prosecution. Custody
of the perpetrator might seem unlikely, and a civil suit with a high probability
of success might already be proceeding. The United States thus needs to
develop a systematic approach to evaluating when it should attempt
prosecution.
The civil law doctrine of forum non conveniens could be helpful in
crafting such an approach for prosecutors. Courts use this mechanism when
making a venue choice between a U.S. and a foreign forum. They weigh
public and private interest factors after an initial determination of an adequate
alternative forum. The court constructed this balancing test in Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert76 and established its modern form in Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno. 177 Piper describes public interest factors as including "local interest
in having localized controversies decided at home," judicial familiarity with the
governing law, and avoiding court congestion. 7 Gilbert discusses the private
interest factors as involving location of proof, witnesses, site of harm, and "all
other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive."'
' 79
This balancing test is not a perfect fit for criminal human rights
prosecutions. It is not designed to handle an international tribunal with primacy
or a domestic court with a pending civil action as the alternative forum. It does
not address the difficulties of obtaining custody since the question does not
arise in a civil context. The fundamental approach, however, of balancing
public and private interests and of considering whether an adequate alternative
forum exists, provides a starting point for a prosecutorial approach.
175. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167. 171-73 (5th Cir 1965)
176. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
177. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
178. 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (quoting Gilbert, 330 US, at 509)
179. 330 U.S. at 508.
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Building upon forum non conveniens analysis, a three-step process could
help to systematize the decision of whether to prosecute. I term this process
"comparative forum conveniens" because it focuses on comparing alternatives
at the initiation stage rather than dismissing for inconvenience. First, the
prosecuting authority should determine whether another government
considering criminal or civil action exists. This initial assessment would
establish potential barriers to the appropriateness of prosecution. If no other
cases exist or are likely to be brought, the prosecutor simply can evaluate the
criminal case as a singular entity. This step is not part of forum non
conveniens analysis, which always involves some sort of alternative forum in
the comparison; it should occur in the prosecutorial context, however, since
parallel litigation is not a given.
Second, the prosecutor should assess the adequacy of the other forums
taking action. This examination flows directly from the forum non conveniens
approach. A real danger of injustice exists when prosecutorial discretion is
used; victims may lack other viable vehicles of redress, and offenders may
escape unpunished. The forum with strongest ties to the crime may, through
inaction or inadequacy, be unlikely to provide for appropriate prosecution. In
the civil context, forum non conveniens dismissal has usually resulted in a
denial (or significantly diminished prospects) of plaintiff redress.' Although
some of this impact in a civil context is due to differing substantive and
procedural law that may be less applicable to criminal prosecution,'
prosecutors should conduct their discretionary analysis with this concern in
mind.
In particular, those conducting the appraisal should determine whether the
forum to which they are deferring actually will expeditiously bring justice.
Even after discretionary nonprosecution has occurred, prosecutors should track
whether the other forum is proceeding and, if no progress occurs, should
reconsider its comparative forum conveniens analysis. Such an approach will
prevent the possibility that statutory expansion would become meaningless
because of overcautious use of discretion.
This adequacy assessment is particularly important when the state in which
the offense occurred prosecutes. States often have some level of responsibility
for the human rights violations occurring within their borders. Governmental
instability and complicity or a judiciary lacking in independence might make
the prospects of obtaining a just prosecution slim. In such a case, the United
States should consider asserting jurisdiction even if its connections to the
1 180. See Molly M. White, Comment, Home FieldAdvantage: The Exploitation of Federal Forum Non
Conveniens by United States Corporations and Its Effects on International Environmental Litigation, 26
Loy. L.A. L. REv. 491, 510-26 (1993).
181. The Court has held that an unfavorable change in the substantive law does not preclude a forum
non conveniens dismissal. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 247 ("The possibility of a change in substantive law
should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.").
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violations are less strong. This type of reasoning flows well from the U.S.
forum non conveniens jurisprudence in a civil context. If a balance of public
and private factors weighs in favor of another forum, the U.S. court will
dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, but only if that other judicial
system will provide an adequate alternative forum.' This approach prevents
potentially unfair situations in which victims cannot obtain redress because
they are forced to use court systems that provide no prospect of relief. In order
for international human rights criminal norms to have meaning, some basis
must exist for the prosecution of violators. Assuming jurisdiction when more
connected forums are not adequate ensures this implementation of
internationally codified values. 83
Third, the prosecutor should conduct a balancing test. In addition to the
traditional forum non conveniens factors, prosecutors should consider the level
of jurisdictional ties to the United States. Even if universal jurisdiction exists
over a violation, the United States nevertheless may not be the most
appropriate forum for the prosecution. When an international criminal law
violation occurs within another country, involves nonnationals who are not
located in the United States, and does not directly threaten U.S. interests, the
case for taking jurisdiction may be less strong than that of another state. If all
states granted jurisdiction for every international criminal law violation, the
absurd result of hundreds of parallel prosecutions might occur. Universal
jurisdiction thus is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
appropriateness of prosecution.
Although this test is useful, the criminal context makes other
considerations important as well. Unlike in a contract or tort dispute, crimes
neatly involve offenders and victims. The forum non conveniens criteria are
not directed toward criminal prosecutorial discretion and thus could use some
supplementation. The four other traditional bases for jurisdiction could help
establish the comparative connectedness of various possible forums to the
crime. Territoriality is clearly the most traditional and well-accepted basis for
jurisdiction." If an act occurs within the United States or if the offender is
located within the United States, a strong forum tie exists. As discussed
182. See Piper, 454 U.S. at 254; In re Union Carbide Corp Gas Plant Disaster. 809 F2d 195. 202-03
(2d Cir. 1987).
183. While this adequacy requirement seems to promote justice, defining its contours is more difficult.
In a forum non conveniens context, U.S. courts have used a low threshold for adequacy, clarifying that
favorableness and adequacy are distinct concepts. See, e.g., Union Carbide. 809 F2d at 198 (discussing
the district court's analysis of the procedural safeguards of the Indian legal system). Given the peculiar
sovereignty concerns of international criminal adjudication, the United States should provide clear standards
for how it evaluates other judiciaries. Although a full discussion of this requirement is beyond the scope
of this Note, I suggest judicial independence and substantive and procedural adequacy as the relevant
categories to consider in such an analysis.
184. See Born, supra note 15, at 6-21; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S Law- Enforcement Abroad 77te
Constitution and International Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 880. 883-84 (1989)
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before,8 5 U.S. courts have pushed this principle of connectedness to its
limits, allowing one's presence within the country to be a sufficient basis for
the territorial connection. Such an approach seems to corrupt the concept of
territoriality and provide a basis for the absurdity that any country could
develop a legitimate territorial link simply by abducting its target. Regardless
of how one views this American extension, however, territoriality more
generally provides the strongest way to show a forum's additional connection
beyond the universality of the crime.
Nationality of offender provides the next strongest secondary jurisdictional
base. Countries have an interest in regulating the behavior of their nationals.
When such a person violates foundational international norms, his or her home
country suffers some level of international embarrassment and injury to the
social fabric.'8 6 The protective and passive personality principles provide a
somewhat more controversial supplementary basis for making a universal
jurisdiction grant situationally appropriate. Although an injury to the United
States through harm to nationals or threats and manipulation provides it with
a stake in the prosecution, its capacity to regulate the offender in question is
weaker than that of a country with a territoriality or nationality connection.8 7
Beyond this assessment of ties, the analysis should consider the needs of
the victims. The decision to prosecute could very well undermine the
remuneration efforts of those who have personally suffered. The prosecutors
should thus assess the comparative merits of civil and criminal suits and the
potential impact of a civil stay, considering questions such as the following:
Do the victims or concerned nongovernmental organizations plan to bring a
civil suit? What is their likelihood of success and recovery? What impact
would such a decision have on the development of jurisprudence and thus
future victims' potential for redress? How high is the probability of collecting
enough evidence for indictment? How lengthy will that collection process
likely be? What are the possibilities for bringing the offender within U.S.
custody? The answers to these questions will help prosecutors balance the
benefits of the criminal trial against the possible harm to victims' civil efforts.
Finally, foreign policy and political feasibility considerations should (and
always will) enter into the prosecutorial assessment. The prosecutor may
decide that overriding policy and national security concerns supersede his or
her desire to bring a violator to justice. Such determinations fall squarely
within the executive branch's authority and are thus appropriate for a
185. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
186. See Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INr'L L. 41, 65 (1992).
187. See Monika B. Krizek, Note, The Protective Principle of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Brief
History and an Application of the Principle to Espionage as an Illustration of Current United States
Practice, 6 B.U. INT'L L.J. 337, 339-40 (1988) (discussing the fact that not all states accept the principle
of protective jurisdiction).
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prosecutor to make.'88 If the executive branch decides not to bring a criminal
action, it should endeavor to avoid unnecessarily interfering with other efforts
to bring a person to justice, both civilly or criminally. In addition, while these
concerns provide legitimate grounds for nonprosecution, they should not be
used as an excuse for the United States to avoid international responsibilities.
The application of the comparative forum conveniens approach to the
scenario with which this Note began exemplifies how it might work in
practice. The prosecutor first would consider whether another potential
litigative forum exists. In this case, the only other action is the U.S. civil one
about to be initiated. The next step would be an adequacy analysis of criminal
alternatives to U.S. prosecution. Since the Chinese government was complicit
in the torture and no other forums have expressed an interest in prosecution,
the U.S. prosecutor likely would conclude that no adequate alternative forum
for criminal prosecution exists. Finally, the prosecutor would apply the relevant
portions of the comparative forum conveniens case, considering the civil suit
and the political considerations. He or she would weigh the potential success
of a civil suit against the difficulties of indictment in time to bring the former
Chinese prison head into custody during his visit. In addition, the prosecutor
would consult throughout the executive branch (in particular, with the State
Department and White House) to evaluate whether the prosecution is politically
possible given the treaty negotiation and other U.S. relations with China. While
the ultimate decision of whether to initiate prosecution would rest on the case-
specific determinations made in these three steps, the process provides a
systematic mechanism for evaluation.
By assessing the prosecution within international and domestic realities,
the comparative conveniens analysis would help avoid the potential pitfalls of
more extensive jurisdiction. It would ensure that U.S. incursions upon state
sovereignty are appropriate and legitimate in the context of other international
efforts. This approach also would include civil remedies within the
prosecutorial calculus, providing more protection for victims, who have the
greatest personal stake in addressing the violations. Finally, a systematic
approach would increase the efficiency of the prosecutorial decision and thus
minimize unnecessary bureaucracy and delays.
V. CONCLUSION
Currently, any analysis of U.S. prosecution of international human rights
violations is necessarily theoretical. Despite its well-developed civil
188. Support for the executive's foreign affairs and national security power can be found in the U S
Constitution and case law. See U.S. CONsT. art It. § 2 (making the President the Commandcrmn-Chief of
the armed forces); United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304. 319-22 (1936) (discussing the President's
authority over foreign affairs); see also United States v. Nixon. 418 U S 683. 706 (1974) (discussing
executive privilege with respect to "sensitive national secunty secrets")
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jurisprudence, the United States only recently has acquired statutory bases to
begin imposing criminal sanctions upon offenders. While its prosecution of
terrorism cases over the last ten years indicates a willingness to implement
these laws, U.S. methods of seizing offenders, though allowed by the courts,
are inappropriate. Indeed, there is a deep irony in using means that arguably
violate human rights to achieve the end of prosecuting those who have
committed violations.
As the United States develops its statutory regime, it should avoid its
current inconsistent implementation of universal jurisdiction based simply on
treaty ratification. Instead, it should establish a regime that actually reflects a
recognition of the state of international law, just as U.S. courts do in the
ATCA context. Withholding jurisdiction should depend on the
inappropriateness of a particular action rather than on spotty codification.
The United States is merely at the first stages of developing a criminal
human rights jurisprudence. Political realities and instructive muddling will
likely characterize the developments over the next few years. This Note's
recommendations provide a starting point for systematization as the United
States begins to develop a comprehensive domestic regime for human rights
redress. Through a balanced and realistic approach, the United States can play
a proper role in ensuring that egregious human rights violators are treated as
the "enem[ies] of all mankind"' 9 that the international community
recognizes them to be.
189. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). The above use of the term seems
particularly appropriate in light of Filartiga, which expanded the use of this term from piracy to torture in
an inspirational passage:
Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations... is the right to be free of physical
torture. Indeed, for the purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become-like the pirate and
slave trader before hir-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our holding
today ... is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people
from brutal violence.
Id. The proposed new criminal jurisdiction over torture perhaps could do in the criminal realm what
Filartiga did in the civil one.
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